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REVIEWS
tial data by categories susceptible of generalization is impossible in the absence
of a greater number of cases on each type of administrative problem. Whether
the multiplication of public administration cases can be pursued to the point
where they may lead to valid generalization is a question both of method and
resources; and the question need not be faced squarely at present, as the cases
already prepared and to be prepared in the immediate future serve other ends
and serve them admirably
It is enough that teachers and students for the first time receive a truly
intimate view of how decisions are made by public administrators; that objec-
tive portrayal of values and realities avoids both Pollyanna and muckraking
interpretations; and that the user of the cases gains deepened understanding
of public policy and of the processes for its determination and execution. These
are gains that should not be confined to students specializing in public adminis-
tration. It is important that the insights be shared by others who will have to
do with administration. Lawyers, whether as judges, legislators, agency counsel,
administrators, or private practitioners, are among those who would gain by
such a sharing.
JAMES W. FESLE4R
RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Hans Kelsen.
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IN this slender volume-which is a supplement to his 900-page treatise The
Law of the United Natio-s '-Professor Kelsen has continued his critical and
"purely legal" analysis of the Charter and its application. The problems dealt
with are: the organization of collective self-defense through the North Atlantic
Treaty; the action in Korea; the reappointment of the Secretary-General; and
the resolution of the General Assembly "Uniting for Peace." In the preface
Kelsen points out that his analysis does not in every respect affirm the con-
stitutionality of the actions under consideration-indeed that these actions may
be considered unconstitutional when "viewed retrospectively With regard to
the Charter." At the same time he adds: "But directing our view towards the
future we may see them [these actions] as the first steps in the development
of a new law of the United Nations." The maxim, cx injuria jus von oritur,
he somewhat dryly notes, may be replaced in these cases by its opposite, ex
iznjuria jus oritur.
No doubt this approach will appeal to many who have tired of the lengthy
and complicated constitutional debates in the United Nations. It has the
appearance of being both objective and realistic; it seems to afford an easy
political answer to difficult legal questions; at the same time it rests on the
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indubitably sound legal principle that the law of a community can adapt itself
to changing circumstances by a process of interpretation as well as by formal
amendment. That Professor Kelsen has put forward this view may even be
regarded as a victory by those who have deplored the rigidity and formalism
of his previous volume. Perhaps one should remain satisfied with this preface
and skip the analysis that follows.
Still, the preface is not quite as innocuous as it appears. It does after all
assume that the United States, and indeed the majority of United Nations
members, have violated the Charter in order to gain political ends. Surely this
is not a matter which can be passed over simply by referring to the emergence
of new law or the misuse of the veto. Whether or not the Charter has been
consistently violated is not a mere legal technicality. It involves the good faith
of the countries concerned, their readiness to abide by agreed principles and
procedures regardless of expediency. These are matters which go to the heart
of the issues dividing the world today. Even the "realists" recognize that con-
siderations of this kind exert an influence on the attitudes and conduct of those
concerned with international affairs.
For this reason it is of some importance, despite Kelsen's disarming preface,
to examine the analysis on which he bases his judgments of unconstitutionality.
Kelsen's technique here is similar to that used in the previous volume. Attention
is focused on the words of the Charter and their meanings; the structure of
the rules and their inter-relationships are carefully analyzed; legal obligations
are emphasized rather than functions, purposes or ideals. In accordance with
the pure theory of law, politics and ideological considerations are avoided or
at least not openly expressed.
As in the main volume, the predominant feature of the analysis is a marked
tendency to restrict and narrow the terms of the Charter. In some cases this
is done simply by introducing into the Charter a somewhat arbitrary definition
without regard to either the ordinary meaning or legislative intent. An illus-
tration of this is found in Kelsen's argument that the attack by the North
Korean forces did not constitute a breach of the peace within the meaning of
the Charter because, according to Kelsen, a breach of international peace can
be committed only by a state in its relation to another state.2 Since North Korea
had not been recognized as a state by the Security Council, it could not break
the international peace. This somewhat surprising conclusion, it should be
noted, does not rest on the circumstance that some Koreans attacked other
Koreans (which is the Russian argument for calling it a "civil" war) but rather
on the formal premise that only the forces of a state can wage war. Thus if
the North Korean forces had attacked Japan or if Eastern Germany (which
like North Korea has not been considered a state by the majority of the United
Nations) were to attack a United Nations member, neither case would fall




At times Kelsen's tendency to circumscribe the authority of United Nations
bodies even overrides his avowed opposition to relying on legislative intention.
For example, in discussing the Security Council's recommendation that mem-
bers assist in repelling the attack of the North Korean forces, Kelsen recognizes
that the Charter in Article 39 not only expressly provides that the Council
may make recommendations after it has found a breach of peace but also that
no limitations are imposed on the content of such recommendations. Despite
this explicit textual authority, Kelsen questions the legality of the Council
resolution on the ground that it was doubtful if the framers intended to authorize
the Council to "recommend," rather than to order, the use of armed forces.3
Kelsen introduces no evidence for his finding of presumed legislative intent
other than the fact that the United States Congress in the United Nations
Participation Act did not authorize the President to provide armed forces in
response to a recommendation of the Council. Even if one does not share the
author's theoretical objection to the use of legislative history, the evidence
Kelsen introduces in this case must be considered slim grounds for overriding
an express provision of the Charter.
These examples are characteristic of Kelsen's analysis; they indicate better
than any general observations why his judgments of unconstitutionality fail to
be convincing. For the most part the arguments he presents are the same as
those already put forward in United Nations debates. He adds little to them
other than an emphasis on fixed and arbitrary definitions and a complicated
manner of presentation.
There is also a curious sort of backtracking throughout the book. After
arguing that a particular action is of doubtful constitutionality, Kelsen in most
cases observes that the contrary interpretation is not excluded. Now, this
should mean, according to his own theory of interpretation,4 that the law-
applying organ has been entirely free to select either of the possible interpre-
tations; in other words, that either choice would be equally correct from a legal
standpoint. It is somewhat perplexing to consider how this theory--which
would afford the widest range of discretion to United Nations organs--can
be reconciled with Kelsen's actual criticism of United Nations actions and his
conclusion that in many respects these actions have been unconstitutional.
Both his theory and his practice run to opposite extremes: the theory so broad
as to eliminate virtually all standards of legal relevance; the actual interpre-
tation so narrow as to place an arbitrary strait-jacket over the acts of United
Nations bodies. In both respects, Kelsen ignores those considerations which
make legal interpretation a significant creative art, capable of effectuating the
major purposes of an instrument when unforeseen events have revealed the
inevitable ambiguities and inconsistencies of the text.
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